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Abstract
Background: Suppressing damaging aggregate behaviors such as insurgency, terrorism, and financial panics are important
tasks of the state. Each outcome of these aggregate behaviors is an emergent property of a system in which each
individual’s action depends on a subset of others’ actions, given by each individual’s network of interactions. Yet there are
few explicit comparisons of strategies for suppression, and none that fully incorporate the interdependence of individual
behavior.
Methods and Findings: Here I show that suppression tactics that do not require the removal of individuals from networks
of interactions are nearly always more effective than those that do. I find using simulation analysis of a general model of
interdependent behavior that the degree to which such less disruptive suppression tactics are superior to more disruptive
ones increases in the propensity of individuals to engage in the behavior in question.
Conclusions: Thus, hearts-and-minds approaches are generally more effective than force in counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency, and partial insurance is usually a better tactic than gag rules in quelling financial panics. Differences
between suppression tactics are greater when individual incentives to support terrorist or insurgent groups, or
susceptibilities to financial panic, are higher. These conclusions have utility for policy-makers seeking to end bloody conflicts
and prevent financial panics. As the model also applies to mass protest, its conclusions provide insight as well into the likely
effects of different suppression strategies undertaken by authoritarian regimes seeking to hold on to power in the face of
mass movements seeking to end them.
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Introduction
States or other actors desiring to suppress damaging aggregate
behaviors including insurgency, terrorism, and financial panics
have a vital interest in the relative efficacy of different tactics of
suppression. Further, these same actors may seek to understand
the spread and likelihood of success of mass movements aimed at
toppling authoritarian regimes. However, comparisons of tactics
are rare [1–6], and none fully account for the manner in which the
spread of these behaviors depends on both individual susceptibility
to the behavior and the degree to which individual behavior is
interdependent [7–13]. I analyze a general model of the
suppression of interdependent behavior that compares the two
primary mechanisms of suppression: altering individual suscepti-
bility, which I call non-disruptive; and reducing exposure to those
already taking part in the behavior, which I call disruptive.
Methods
Individuals in the model are described by three variables. The
first represents individual susceptibility to support terrorism or
insurgency, participate in protests or mass movements, or succumb
to financial panic. This variable may be a function, for example, of
interests, private information, or economic status. Examples of
populations with high susceptibility towards participation in
aggregate behaviors designed to alter actions by the state might
include African-Americans in parts of the American South during
the late 1950s or working class Catholics in Belfast in 1969. The
second variable represents exposure to financial panic, or to the
ideas, information, and influence of those supporting terrorism or
insurgency or participating in protests or mass movements. The
third specifies whether one supports a terrorist or insurgent group,
participates in a protest or mass movement, or panics during a
financial crisis and attempts to withdraw money from the system. I
label participation any of support, participation, or panic, and call
the proportion of the population participating the participation
rate. The model (detailed in Supporting Information File S1
section 1) assumes that exposure is increasing in the participation
rate [7,9,13] at a rate proportional to the transmissibility of the
behavior. If exposure exceeds a threshold determined by
susceptibility, an individual participates. Results below assume
that individuals can cease participation of their own accord should
exposure again drop below this threshold. This is the natural
assumption for support for terrorism or insurgency, participation
in protests or mass movements, and participation in some financial
panics, but nothing substantive changes if participation cannot be
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assumption for most financial panics. The population size in all
results below is 1,000 individuals (see Supporting Fig. S2 for the
effect of varying population size).
I consider two suppression tactics mirroring the two mecha-
nisms for suppression. The first I call disruptive, as it removes
individuals from the population to eliminate the effect of their
participation on others. This approach typically involves military
or police force in insurgency, terrorism, protests, or mass
movements, and entails collateral psychological or economic
damage [14–17]. Force eliminates supporters and reduces
exposure to supporters’ ideas, influence, and information.
Examples include imprisonment, deportation, rendition, and
assassination. Stops on trading coupled with gag rules [18] serve
as disruptive suppression in financial panics, as they prevent the
further influence of the participant. Disruptive suppression is
implemented in the model by the removal of participating
individuals at a rate corresponding to the strength of suppression.
The second tactic of suppression I denote non-disruptive as it
alters susceptibility rather than removes individuals. In counter-
insurgency or counterterrorism this is often referred to as a hearts-
and-minds approach; the same term could easily be applied in
countering protests or mass movements. Disincentives to individ-
ual support include institutional and infrastructure development,
job creation, and education. The primary mode of suppression of
bank runs and other financial panics [19,20] is insurance. Partial
insurance or government bailouts are non-disruptive tactics that
alter susceptibility to panic by reducing the cost of financial
collapse. Non-disruptive suppression is implemented in the model
by altering all individuals’ susceptibilities at a rate corresponding
to the strength of suppression.
The order of operations in the model (see Supporting Fig. S1) is:
1) Susceptibilities are distributed across the population, 2) The
level of exposure updates based on the participation rate, 3)
Individuals make participation decisions based on a comparison
between their susceptibilities and exposure, 4) Suppression occurs,
and 5) Steps 2–4 repeat until participation is zero. I analyze the
model using simulation (see Supporting Information File S1
section 2) and find consistent evidence that non-disruptive tactics
are generally more efficacious than disruptive ones. Fig. 1 displays
the mean response of the maximum participation rate achieved
during a simulation history to the strength of suppression. I
examine the maximum as it captures the point of greatest threat.
Different curves in a plot correspond to different levels of
transmissibility. The scales for suppressive strength were chosen
so that a reduction of susceptibility produces roughly the same
instantaneous change to one’s behavior as does another’s removal,
at full population with maximal transmissibility. Plots labeled
Figure 1. Effect of suppression on maximum participation level. (A) and (B) display the effect of disruptive tactics on maximum participation
levels. (C) and (D) display the effect of non-disruptive tactics on the same. (A) and (C) use populations with lower susceptibilities than (B) and (D); each
curve represents a different level of transmissibility. (E) and (F) display the differences between participation under disruptive and non-disruptive
tactics (subtracting (C) from (A) and (D) from (B)), using respectively populations with lower and higher susceptibilities.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018545.g001
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susceptible individuals than those labeled higher susceptibility (see
Supporting Information File S1 section 2).
Results
Figs. 1A–D display the effects of disruptive and non-disruptive
suppression on maximal participation in populations with lower
and higher susceptibility; Figs. 1E and 1F display the differences in
participation under disruptive and non-disruptive suppression in
each case. Though the functional dependence of participation on
suppression strength is similar in both cases, Figs. 1E and 1F
indicate that non-disruptive suppression is significantly more
effective, with each level of transmissibility possessing a suppres-
sion strength at which the benefits of non-disruptive suppression
are the most substantial. Only when both tactics are extremely
effective can disruptive tactics compete. Non-disruptive tactics
better take advantage of positive feedbacks in interdependent
behavior, reducing susceptibility without increasing the relevance
of remaining participants, as does the reduction in the population
caused by disruptive tactics. This is particularly important under
high susceptibility, when early participation is more widespread.
These results hold even more strongly when considering the mean
level of support for terrorism or insurgency, or participation in
protests or mass movements, where coopting participants can be a
powerful tool (see Supporting Fig. S3).
Fig. 1 does not imply a lack of complementarity between the
two tactics, so in Fig. 2 I apply both tactics simultaneously to see if
a combination might be superior. To avoid conflating nonlinea-
rities arising from increasing suppressive strength and from
complementarities, I keep total suppressive strength fixed while
varying the proportion given to non-disruptive tactics, for several
levels of suppressive strength. Fig. 2 illustrates that increasing the
proportion of non-disruptive tactics either has little effect on
participation or strictly decreases it. Whenever non-disruptive
tactics are better than disruptive ones individually, no combination
of the two is superior to pure non-disruption. I note that this
scenario is the best case for the use of disruptive tactics, as I am
assuming they do not lead the population to distrust non-disruptive
approaches.
States desiring to suppress participation may care as much
about cost-effectiveness as they do the functional response to
Figure 2. Aggregate maximal participation plotted against the proportion of the total suppression strength applied to non-
disruptive tactics. Each curve represents a different total suppression strength. (A) and (C) use a population with lower susceptibilities than (B) and
(D). (A) and (B) use greater transmissibility than (C) and (D).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018545.g002
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not specify the cost of one unit of suppression arising from either
tactic. Thus, I perform two additional analyses. First, I note that
disruptive tactics may entail additional logistical costs, increasing
in the number of individuals removed. Figs. 3A and 3B display the
total number of individuals removed from the population in the
course of bringing the level of participation to zero, under lower
and higher susceptibility respectively. As Fig. 3 indicates, the
number removed can be significant, particularly when suscepti-
bility is high. Further, in all cases the total number removed is
non-monotonic in the rate of suppression; sufficiently fast removal
prevents early participants from affecting others, reducing the
overall number removed. In cases in which logistical, financial, or
moral costs prevent sufficiently quick action, the total number of
people eventually affected by state action greatly increases,
potentially leading to substantial induced costs. Thus, non-
disruptive tactics are likely to become relatively more cost-effective
when rapid state action is impeded.
Second, I note that disruptive tactics can lead to anger-induced
micromobilization [21,22], as people respond emotionally to the
removal of others. Unlike the other results, this is primarily an
issue for support for terrorism or insurgency, or participation in
protests or mass movements, though one could imagine that gag
rules and bans on selling might exacerbate panic in that they are
signals of the weakness of the financial system. Fig. 4 explores the
effect of varying the strength of emotional, angry responses to
removal, modeled as an increase in susceptibility that occurs after
each removal. The horizontal axes are one-fifth the scale of those
in the plots in Fig. 1, each line represents a different level of
suppression, and the horizontal line corresponding to no removal
provides a baseline. Any level of participation greater than this line
indicates a counterproductive action on the part of the state,
leading to backlash by the population that is worse for the state
than the original collective action would have been in the absence
of suppression. Figs. 4B and 4D indicate that under higher
susceptibility the addition of anger diminishes the efficacy of
suppression but does not render it counterproductive. In contrast,
Figs. 4A and 4C illustrate that under lower susceptibility, unless
suppressive strength is very high, anger plays a strong, nonlinear
role, and suppression becomes counterproductive in many cases.
Discussion
Considered together, the results of Figs. 1–4 provide strong
evidence of the superiority of non-disruptive tactics of suppression,
particularly when susceptibilities are comparatively high or the
possibility of an emotional response to disruptive tactics is present.
Table 1 provides a concise summary of these results, along with
Figure 3. Number of individuals removed. (A) and (B) display the number of individuals removed during the period of nonzero participation. (A)
uses a population with lower susceptibilities than (B). Each curve assumes a different level of transmissibility.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018545.g003
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conclusions suggest expanded use of hearts and minds in
counterterror and counterinsurgency operations at the expense
of force, and the utility of both institutionalized insurance and
government bailouts for limiting financial panics. They also imply
that only the most brutal crackdowns by threatened authoritarian
regimes would be more effective at maintaining the regime’s
power than would be a less disruptive, less violent approach.
Finally, the generality and expandability of the simulation model,
described fully in the Supporting Information File S1, provides a
jumping off point for further exploration of the effect of
suppression on collective action in other contexts [23] in a way
Figure 4. Aggregate maximal participation plotted against the size of the emotional response to the removal of others. Each curve
represents a different removal rate. (A) and (C) use a population with lower susceptibilities than (B) and (D). (A) and (B) use greater transmissibility
than (C) and (D). The horizontal line corresponding to no removal is a baseline.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018545.g004






Relative Benefit of Non-disruptive
Suppression
Susceptibility Increases Increases Increases
Transmissibility Unchanged Increases Alters effect of increasing Suppression
Strength on
Suppression Strength N/A Decreases Increases, then Decreases
Size of Emotional, Angry Response N/A Increases Increases
Columns 2–4 display the effect of increases in the parameter in the first column on, respectively: the participation rate when there is no suppression, the participation
rate when there is suppression, and the degree to which non-disruptive suppression tactics are more effective than disruptive suppression tactics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018545.t001
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as seen in Section 2.1 of the Supporting Information File S1.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Schematic of the order of operations of the model
(TIFF)
Figure S2 Kernel density plots for the maximal participation
level under two rates of removal: (A) Low (x=0.0005 N) and (B)
High (x=0.005 N). (A) and (B) each contain six subplots that vary
N and s.
(TIFF)
Figure S3 Effect of suppression on mean participation level. (A)
and (B) display the effect of disruptive tactics on mean
participation levels. (C) and (D) display the effect of non-disruptive
tactics on the same. (A) and (C) use populations with lower
susceptibilities than (B) and (D); each curve represents a different
level of transmissibility. (E) and (F) display the differences between
participation under disruptive and non-disruptive tactics (subtract-
ing (C) from (A) and (D) from (B)), using respectively populations
with lower and higher susceptibilities.
(TIFF)
Figure S4 Effect of suppression on maximum participation level;
no one can cease participating. (A) and (B) display the effect of
disruptive tactics on maximum participation levels. (C) and (D)
display the effect of non-disruptive tactics on the same. (A) and (C)
use populations with lower susceptibilities than (B) and (D); each
curve represents a different level of transmissibility. (E) and (F)
display the differences between participation under disruptive and
non-disruptive tactics (subtracting (C) from (A) and (D) from (B)),
using respectively populations with lower and higher susceptibil-
ities.
(TIFF)
Figure S5 Aggregate maximal participation plotted against the
proportion of the total suppression strength applied to non-
disruptive tactics; no one can cease participating. Each curve
represents a different total suppression strength. (A) and (C) use a
population with lower susceptibilities than (B) and (D). (A) and (B)
use greater transmissibility than (C) and (D).
(TIFF)
Figure S6 Number of individuals removed; no one can cease
participating. (A) and (B) display the number of individuals
removed during the period of nonzero participation. (A) uses a
population with lower susceptibilities than (B). Each curve assumes
a different level of transmissibility.
(TIFF)
File S1 Supporting Information
(PDF)
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